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ABSTRACT 
 Guided by Ericson’s counter-law analytic, the focus of this thesis is how peace 
bonds erode traditional principles of criminal law to govern risk and provide applicants 
with a “freedom from fear” (Ericson, 2007a). Peace Bonds, proscribed under s. 810 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada, permit the courts to impose a recognizance on anyone likely to 
cause harm or “personal injury” to a complainant. Drawing on publicly available 
literature, the leading peace bond case law, the Lori DuPont Inquest, and official Practice 
Memoranda, this thesis conducted a critical discourse analysis to answer the question: 
how and to what extent are peace bonds a form of counter-law? Facilitated by the erosion 
of traditional criminal law principles and rationalized under a precautionary logic, 
proving that a complainant is fearful under s. 810 can result in the expansion of the state’s 
capacity to criminalize and administer surveillance through police and community 
notification and supervision.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 Guided by Ericson’s counter-law analytic, the focus of this thesis is how peace 
bonds erode traditional principles of criminal law to govern risk and provide applicants 
with a “freedom from fear” (Ericson, 2007a). According to the Newfoundland Provincial 
Court in Miller v. Miller, the power to bind people under a bond to keep the peace “...is of 
ancient origin, so remote, in fact, that the precise sources and the derivation of it are all 
but lost to jurisprudential history” (1990: 252-53). Notions of bonds to keep the peace 
date as far back as 60 A.D. when the Apostle Paul mentioned them in his letters from 
prison, encouraging the peaceful unity of Christian people within the churches1. As a 
formal legal entity, bonds of peace were used in seventeenth century Scotland to oblige 
noblemen, gentlemen, tenants and servants to keep the public peace. If this bond was 
broken, a nobleman would pay his annual rent on all properties, a tenant would pay every 
tenant’s annual rent, and a servant would sacrifice his or her annual fee (Blair, McCrie 
and Row, 1848: 515). The aforementioned legal obligation to keep the peace is at the core 
of Canada’s contemporary peace bond law. Proscribed under s. 810 of the Criminal Code 
of Canada, peace bonds permit the courts to impose a recognizance on anyone likely to 
cause personal injury to a complainant. Once proven on a balance of probabilities that a 
complainant has reasonable grounds to fear a respondent, the respondent is bound by 
conditions proscribed by the court aimed at keeping the peace between the affected 
parties. These conditions require that the respondent not associate directly or indirectly 
with the complainant or anyone named in the court order for a period not exceeding one 
                                                 
1 “I, therefore, the prisoner of the Lord, beseech you to walk worthy of the calling with which you were 
called, with all lowliness and gentleness, with longsuffering, bearing with one another in love, endeavoring 
to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace” (Ephesians 4:1-4 emphasis added).  
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year (Neumann, 1994). However, if the court finds it necessary, peace bond orders can be 
renewed an indefinite number of times upon their expiry (Grant, 1998).  
 There have been several amendments to Canada’s peace bond regime that have 
extended its reach, incorporating multiple purposes—preventing future crime or reacting 
to crime in place of probation—and a large number of potential offences. First, in 1993, 
parliament decided to reform peace bond legislation by extending its scope through Bill 
C-126, currently found under s. 810.1 of the Criminal Code. According to the Honourable 
Justice Gordon Kirkby, this law “allows the court to impose an order where there are 
reasonable grounds to fear that a person will commit a sex offence against someone under 
the age of 14 years” (Kirkby in Crawford, 2000: 2). Then, in 1997, parliament once again 
extended the scope of peace bond law under Bill C-55, currently found under s. 810.2. As 
explained by Kirkby in his speech to parliament:  
This new order is designed, somewhat more generally [than s. 810.1], to 
prevent serious personal injury offences. Despite the controversy swirling 
around this measure, its underlying principle has been clear from the 
beginning. The goal has always been to prevent violent incidents, to establish 
in a court of law the risk presented by certain individuals and to command 
those individuals to keep the peace and be of good behaviour; in other words, 
to meet the standard of conduct that is expected of them as participants in 
society (Parliament of Canada, 1997).  
 
Although applications under 810.1 and 810.2 can be used to impose a recognizance on 
anyone likely to cause personal injury of a violent or sexual nature to a complainant, these 
peace bond applications have been largely used in situations when a violent offender, a 
sex offender, or a violent sex offender has served his or her whole sentence and is 
released to the community without supervision (Crawford, 2000). In these situations, a 
peace bond under s. 810.1 or s. 810.2 may also be used in place of probation as a form of 
community protection and risk management (Petrunik, 2002). Finally, in 2001, parliament 
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amended s. 810.01 under bill C-362, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, to expand investigative 
powers and create new offences to act against terrorism (Roach, 2005). Originally 
adopted in 1997 as a recognizance aimed at “criminal organizations,” s. 810.01 was 
widened under Bill C-36 to include fear of a “terrorism offence” as grounds to seek a 
peace bond (Trotter, 2001: 241). According to Ericson, these amendments to Canada’s 
peace bond regime are typical of a counter-law regime, which is designed to cast the net 
as widely as possible to identify suspected enemies that may cause harm (2007b: 388).     
 Justice Kirkby admired these community protection and risk management 
approaches, particularly in comparison to methods used in the United States: 
I am not interested in amending the Criminal Code for the benefit of the prison 
industry. There are some useful American approaches to criminal justice 
policy, but the facts show that too often prison is seen as the solution to every 
crime problem resulting in too many non-violent and low risk offenders being 
caught in the net. 
 
It is too simplistic, too expensive and it simply does not work. The alternative 
is the one that this government has proposed, a targeted approach where we 
use imprisonment for serious offenders and use community based controls for 
others (Kirkby in Crawford, 2000: 3).        
 
Kirkby implies that the approaches used by peace bond provisions “work” better than 
prison-based sanctions. However, this thesis explores peace bonds, not to determine their 
effectiveness, but rather as a “governmental technology” in relation to a precautionary 
“political rationality” (Rose and Miller, 1992). This thesis research examines the 
assumptions deployed in peace bond discourse and the implications these representations 
have for the governance of risk using discourse analysis. For this analysis, data was 
drawn from publicly available texts, specifically pamphlets and handbooks about the 
                                                 This bill also created a new peace bond under s. 83.3 of the Criminal Code entitled “Recognizance with 
Conditions.” This peace bond will not be discussed because, as noted by Trotter, “...the section is more 
concerned with arrest and detention, than with recognizances or conditions” (2001: 242).   
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peace bond process and the text of two important legal decisions regarding peace bonds: 
Miller v. Miller and R v. Budreo. As Ericson and Haggerty suggest, although discourse 
both constitutes and is constituted by practice, analytical separation must be maintained 
between the two (1997: 84). Accordingly, a small portion of this thesis analyzes practices 
separately from discourse but it ultimately views their implications under the same 
theoretical lens. The examination of practices uses data from official “Practice 
Memoranda” given to Crown prosecutors in the province of Ontario; peace bond statistics 
from the province of Ontario; and official texts from the Lori Dupont Coroner’s Inquest. 
Using three prongs of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law analytic to aid in the analysis of 
discourse and practices—namely the politics of uncertainty, law against law, and 
surveillant assemblage—helps answer this thesis’ main research question: how and to 
what extent are peace bonds a form of counter-law?  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL APPROACH: ERICSON’S COUNTER-LAW ANALYTIC 
 Recent criminological and socio-legal literature has focused considerable attention 
on notions of risk and harm prevention (e.g. Castel, 1991; Moore and Valverde, 2000; 
Hudson and Bramhall, 2005; Scott, 2005; Bell, 2006). This fascination is inherent in the 
modern risk society, which is dominated by the omnipresence of potential risks. The 
focus of the population becomes more the prevention of socially distributed “bads” than 
the facilitation of socially distributed “goods” (Beck, 1992: 3; Ericson and Haggerty, 
1997: 6). This literature has prompted criminologists like Zedner (2007) to highlight a 
refocusing of criminological inquiry away from post-hoc reactions to crime, like prison, 
and toward “pre-crime” or proactive crime prevention. Ericson (2007a) identifies the 
Western world’s tendency to criminalize all imaginable sources of harm. This trend, a by-
product of the risk society, is facilitated by the “politics of uncertainty” and a 
“precautionary logic” that encourages populations to contingently envisage and actively 
prevent potential harms. Insecurity caused by the uncertainty of risk and harm has 
become a main concern for neo-liberal governments that attempt to enterprise their 
citizens to act autonomously through freedom (Foucault, 1979/2008: 148; Rose, 1996: 
340; Hamann, 2009: 53). It becomes the job of the neo-liberal state to transform 
uncertainty into security that enables both safety and freedom—more specifically, 
freedom from fear (Ericson, 2007a: 3, 163). This is accomplished by the state acting 
through risk and the politics of uncertainty—using both scientific and legal methods to 
“act as if the future is knowable and governable” (Ericson, 2007a: 16). Legally, to act 
against any potential source of harm, the state must not let the limits within the law stand 
in its way of criminalizing risky populations. Accordingly, the state must make law that 
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facilitates and expedites criminalization, even at the expense of eroding the law’s 
traditional principles. This erosion of law’s traditional principles for the purposes of 
preemption and risk governance is what Ericson (2007a) refers to as “counter-law.”  
 Counter-law takes two forms. One form is “law against law,” which enacts a new 
law or changes an existing law to “erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards, and 
procedures of criminal law that get in the way of preempting imagined sources of harm” 
(Ericson, 2007a: 24). High standards of proof and evidence in criminal law create 
uncertainty and, thus, must be diminished to act against criminal behaviour (Ericson, 
2007a: 25). Law against law “...also involves efforts to counter the traditional distinctions 
between the different legal forms of criminal, civil, and administrative law” (Ericson, 
2007a: 25). This method of criminalization is particularly compelling after catastrophic 
failure in a risk management system for which the government is held responsible 
(Ericson, 2007a: 24). Counter-law II also uses new law to erode traditional principles in 
criminal law that hinder the preemption of harm and risk but does so to create new 
surveillance infrastructures or extend existing methods of surveillance (Ericson, 2007a: 
24). Ultimately, the creation and extension of surveillance infrastructures creates a 
“surveillant assemblage” that operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial 
setting and separates them into a series of discrete flows that are reassembled into distinct 
“data doubles” that can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000: 2). Although the notion of “data doubles” implies that all components of 
the assemblage must be digital or technological in nature, Haggerty and Ericson explicitly 
suggest that this may not always be the case—“In situations where it is not yet practical to 
technologically link surveillance systems, human contact can serve to align and coalesce 
discrete systems” (2000: 610-11; see also Wilkinson and Lippert, 2011). Examples of this 
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can be seen in “multi-agency” policing where the police align themselves with, for 
example, social workers to scrutinize “at risk” individuals (Ericson and Haggerty, 1999: 
256-91). Generally, however, nodes of a “surveillant assemblage” have been 
conceptualized in many forms, including information and communication technologies 
used in governing mobility in cities (Graham and Wood, 2003), the use of state-wide 
databases to monitor welfare recipients (Hier, 2003), and traffic cameras that detect an 
offence and issue a fine (O’Malley, 2010).  
 This thesis views Ericson’s notion of “precautionary logic”—deployed to transform 
the “politics of uncertainty” from doubt to preemption through criminalization (Ericson, 
2007a: 20-4)—as a political “strategy” or “rationality.” In 1979, Donzelot (1979) refers to 
three concepts that form a governmentality research program (Lippert and Stenson, 
2010). The three concepts in his study are: strategies, technologies, and programmes. 
“Strategies,” later called “rationalities” (e.g. Rose and Miller, 1992), can be seen as: 
 A way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government 
(who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of 
making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both on its 
practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced. (Gordon, 1991: 3) 
 
Precautionary logic fits this construct. It is a way of thinking about the uncertain ability 
of liberal governments to govern the future and provide security (Ericson, 2007a: 21). It 
is through this rationality that criminalization via counter-law becomes thinkable and 
practical. Counter-law, then, can be seen as a “technology” meant to deploy the 
aforementioned political rationality. This suggests that Ericson’s framework fits with a 
governmentality problematic. Miller and Rose argue that an analysis of governmentality 
has a discursive character that requires a particular attention to language (2008: 29-30). 
Given this delineation, this thesis critically analyzes peace bond textual discourse to see 
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whether tenets of Ericson’s counter-law analytic are present in them. Further, since 
discourse both constitutes and is constituted by practice (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 
84), a portion of this analysis in effect also examines peace bond practices as they relate 
to Ericson’s counter-law analytic.    
A theoretical framework that has gained much scholarly attention in the past 
decade and which is similar to Ericson’s is delineated by Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) 
“state of exception.”3 This framework is explicitly linked to counter-law by Ericson, who 
states that “[c]ounter-law is officially expressed as a ‘state of exception’...Normal legal 
principles, standards and procedures must be suspended because of a state of emergency, 
extreme uncertainty or threat to security...” (2007a: 26; 2007b: 388). However, despite 
this link, several issues arise when considering adopting the state of exception theoretical 
framework in the proposed analysis. The most significant issue is that Agamben’s 
construct serves more as a general theory of government than a specific analytic that can 
be used in the analysis of peace bond discourse and practices. Most literature that 
engages with the exception views it as a method of governing (Dean, 2007; Lippert and 
Williams, 2012) and a theory or concept (Aradau and van Munster, 2009; Ralph, 2009). 
It does not appear to be referred to as an “analytic.” The essential themes of Ericson’s 
theory, however, have been used as analytical tools to engage with “lay narratives of 
insecurity” that legitimized the City of Chicago’s former Gang Ordinance (Levi, 2009), 
the regulatory practices employed under the UK’s Anti-social Behavior Orders 
                                                 
3 According to Agamben’s interpretation of Carl Schmitt’s (1922/1985) original work, the state of 
exception is a space devoid of law, where the divergence between legislative power and executive power 
takes place—a legal normlessness. It is a proverbial “…no-man’s-land between public law and political 
fact…” (2005: 1) in which the state exercises its sovereign power by acting outside the law to bring order 
during times of perceived chaos while also seeking to prevent possible situations from becoming chaos 
(Aradau and van Munster, 2009; Dean, 2010). 
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(Crawford, 2009), and the narrative content of a CCTV/Crime Stoppers “assemblage” 
(Lippert and Wilkinson, 2010). Agamben’s work does not delineate these essential 
themes to form an analytic, but rather articulates a more general “diagram” of power 
(Dean, 2010). Therefore, despite the continued popularity of Agamben’s perspective, this 
thesis prefers Ericson’s counter-law analytic as its main theoretical perspective. The 
politics of uncertainty, law against law (counter-law I), and surveillant assemblage 
(counter-law II) guided the analysis of discourse and practices to determine how and to 
what extent peace bonds are a form of counter-law. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON PEACE BONDS 
 Peace bonds are a neglected area of study in the criminological and socio-legal 
literatures. Grant (1998) provides an overview of s. 810.1 and s. 810.2 while comparing 
the “post-detention” monitoring of high-risk offenders in Canada and the United States. 
The author suggests that these peace bonds represent a “post-detention regime” that has 
survived constitutional scrutiny and is a much less extreme alternative to those imposed 
in the United Sates (Grant, 1998: 236, 239). MacAlister recognizes that peace bonds are 
an exception to a fundamental legal rule that sanctions are to be imposed to punish past 
rather than future conduct (2005: 20). Most attention given to peace bonds, however, is 
done in reference to sex offender regulation (e.g. Petrunik, 2003). According to Petrunik’s 
(2002) comparative analysis, the creation of peace bonds specifically for pedophiles (s. 
810.1) is found mainly in Canada. Again, if a person is found at risk of committing a 
sexual offence against children, a peace bond can prohibit him or her from contacting 
children younger than 14 and from being in locations one would reasonably expect to find 
children. Petrunik views the use of peace bonds in the regulation of sex offenders as a 
“community protection/risk management approach” (2002: 496-8). This approach is 
largely predicated on “community social controls” that include “circles of support.” 
“Circles of Support” is a program composed of four to seven people who agree to help the 
offender avoid reoffending by giving him or her daily visits and phone calls (2002: 504).  
 Petrunik limits his analysis to how peace bonds generate community surveillance 
via “circles of support.” This is problematic because the support program may not be 
made available to all sex offenders who are subject to a s. 810 recognizance. As stated by 
Petrunik, “[o]ffenders considered for the [‘circles of support’]  project lack community 
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support, are considered at high risk to reoffend, and typically are high-profile cases who 
have been subjected to a peace bond on release and sometimes community notification 
under provincial community safety legislation” (2002: 504). His example does not draw a 
clear link between peace bonds and surveillance given that the “circles of support” 
program is mostly used in “high-profile cases” and the participants must be selected to 
participate. Other sex offenders subject to a peace bond may escape the communal 
surveillance employed. This thesis research has attempted to overcome this limitation by 
examining whether community notification and surveillance are far reaching by-products 
of Canada’s peace bond regime. Further, this thesis analyzes peace bonds in their own 
right and not only in relation to “pedophile peace bonds.”      
 Neumann’s (1994) research also provides a critical examination of peace bonds, 
particularly as they relate to abused women. In his work, Neumann highlights several 
issues Canada’s peace bond regime encompasses, including “personal injury 
requirements” and “procedural delays.” First, the author suggests that judicial 
interpretations of s. 810 have not created a clear understanding of how “personal injury” 
requirements are to be met (1994: 189). Since a peace bond is based on a complainant’s 
ability to prove his or her fear of personal injury, a lacking definition of “personal injury” 
creates an evidentiary obstacle. Second, Neumann states that “[t]here is perhaps no single 
matter of greater concern to batter women who decide to seek protection from their 
assailants than that they receive it without delay” (1994: 184). The author argues that 
“procedural delays” are largely due to adjournments and the extensive time it takes a 
peace bond application to be heard in court (1994: 184-5). Overall, Neumann’s research 
is quite dated. This thesis attempted to update this research by referring to recent 
discourses and practices that relate to peace bonds. Specifically, analyzing these 
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discourses and practices questioned whether the issues of “personal injury requirements” 
and “procedural delays” are still relevant concerns.      
 Unlike previous literature analyzing peace bonds, this thesis does not limit itself to 
sex offender regulation or abused women, nor does it merely provide an overview of 
peace bond legislation. Given the nascent nature of counter-law literature, no research has 
attempted to make a connection between peace bonds and counter-law. Accordingly, this 
thesis is the first study to link peace bonds with counter-law, thereby filling a gap in the 
existing literature. Studying this potential link is important because it may call into 
question a far-reaching peace bond regime that is being used for multiple purposes, 
includes many possible offences, and has the capacity to affect the lives of many people. 
Further, unlike Chicago’s Gang Ordinance that was struck down in 1999 (Levi, 2009), 
peace bonds are still used by both the courts and fearful complainants, making this 
analysis relevant and contemporary. By adopting Ericson’s counter-law analytic in its 
analysis, this thesis will attempt to contribute to the existing literature by considering 
peace bonds as counter-law. Accordingly, the question guiding this thesis is: how and to 
what extent are peace bonds a form of counter-law?  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA SOURCES AND METHOD 
 To answer the aforementioned research question, this thesis drew on five data 
sources. The primary data source came from pamphlets and handbooks available to 
victims, attorneys, and the general public in a digital format through the Internet or as a 
hard copy distributed through government programs. Generally, this literature is designed 
to inform its readers about peace bonds, how they function, how to obtain them, and their 
implications after the court makes an order. It is likely that, since these pamphlets and 
handbooks are distributed to victims through Victim/Witness assistance programs and the 
general public through Public Legal Education initiatives or through a simple Internet 
search, they are read by large numbers of people. The pamphlets can be seen to constitute 
and circulate a truth in law. It is in their truth-telling ability, or “language of expertise” 
(Miller and Rose, 2008: 35), that the pamphlets form a power relationship with the reader 
(Valverde, 2003: 1-2). Thus, this literature has the potential to impact and shape a large 
number of people’s knowledge about peace bonds through the power relationship it 
creates.  
 There were eleven pamphlets and handbooks used in this analysis: a legal rights 
handbook provided by the Victim/Witness assistance program and published by 
Community Legal Education Ontario entitled “Do you know a woman who is being 
abused?” A pamphlet called “Creating a Safety Plan” developed by The Peel Committee 
Against Women Abuse, also available through the Victim/Witness assistance program. A 
document found through the Internet called “Peace Bonds” prepared by the Canadian 
Resources Center for Victims of Crime that, unlike most of the other literature, focuses on 
general victimization and not just domestic violence. A pamphlet found through the 
 14
Internet called “For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders” published by 
British Columbia’s Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General. A pamphlet available 
through the Manitoba Justice Victim Services called “Legal Options for Protection from 
Domestic Violence and Stalking.” A pamphlet called “Peace Bonds: What to do if you 
are being threatened or harassed” published in Saskatchewan by the Public Legal 
Education Association. A pamphlet entitled “Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders” found 
through the internet and published by Public Legal Education and Information Service of 
New Brunswick. “Teachers Rights,” published by Public Legal Education and 
Information Association of Newfoundland. “Assaulted, threatened, or harassed?” 
available through Newfoundland’s Victim Services programs and published by the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. Another Internet document entitled “Peace 
Bonds” published by the Legal Information Society of Nova Scotia. Finally, a handbook 
for Crown prosecutors entitled “Criminal Code Peace Bonds.” These pamphlets and 
handbooks were not only selected because of their public availability, they were also 
selected based on the researcher’s desire to have one pamphlet from almost every 
province in Canada to obtain uniformity.  
 The next two data sources came from the cases of Miller v. Miller and R v. 
Budreo. The court in Miller v. Miller delineated the burden of proof required to obtain a 
peace bond. Alternatively, legal professionals commonly refer to R v. Budreo as the 
leading peace bond case4. The courts in both Miller and Budreo spent considerable time 
discussing the nature of peace bonds and, because of their legally binding status, the 
                                                 Attorneys who commonly work with peace bond applications suggested analyzing this case. During 
informal discussions with several crown attorneys, they referred to R v. Budreo as “the leading peace bond 
case.” 
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courts’ conceptualizations must be followed by other courts in future cases. Thus, like the 
pamphlets and handbooks, Miller v. Miller and R v. Budreo can be seen to constitute and 
circulate a truth in law. Further, because these cases are both read by legal professionals 
inquiring about peace bonds and are publicly available through the Internet5, it is also 
conceivable that people’s knowledge about peace bonds are shaped by this case law (e.g. 
Valverde, 1999; 2005; 2008). Based on their ability to shape public knowledge of peace 
bonds, this thesis considers Miller v. Miller and R v. Budreo important parts of peace 
bond discourse. For this reason, they will be included in this analysis.    
 This thesis used critical discourse analysis. This method was adopted because of 
the discursive character of governmentality (Miller and Rose, 2008: 29). Since Ericson’s 
(2007a) analytic has been situated in a governmentality problematic, the analysis of text 
becomes necessary. Currently regarded as one key element of governmentality studies, 
discourse analysis was almost synonymous with Foucault’s name in the early 1990s 
(Rose, O’Malley and Valverde, 2006: 89). The goal of critical discourse analysis is to 
explore the relationship between discourse and social developments in different social 
domains (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002: 60). Discourses can be seen as ways of 
representing aspects of the world (Fairclough, 2007: 124). For the purposes of this study, 
the discourse under examination is the representation of peace bonds in written text—
pamphlets and case law specifically. This discourse has been analyzed in relation to 
developments suggested by Ericson’s counter-law framework. To aid in the analysis of 
peace bond discourse, I coded for main themes meant to “capture” something important 
about these data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this case, the analysis of peace bond 
                                                 
5 R v. Budreo can be found at vancouver.ca/police/justice/documents/NJCManual/RvBudreo.pdf and a 
summary of Miller v. Miller can be found under Duhaime.org’s definition and discussion of peace bonds at 
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/PeaceBond.aspx.   
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discourse has sought to capture whether tenets of Ericson’s counter-law analytic are 
present in the texts. Their presence would suggest a counter-law exists, at least to some 
extent. “Politics of uncertainty” was operationalized in relation to “precautionary logic” 
and has been expressed through invocation of fear and the threat of crime in peace bond 
texts. Specifically, this analysis searched for assertions about a complainant’s fear of 
crime, the possibility of future victimization, and how peace bonds can facilitate a 
“freedom from fear” through a potential capacity to prevent crime. The notion of “law 
against law” was operationalized in relation to traditional legal principles that, according 
to Ericson, seem to be embodied in distinctions between forms of law and principles of 
evidence (2007a: 25). However, I also included those principles reflected in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Legal aspects associated with peace bonds that were 
contrary to an aforementioned traditional legal principle were deemed a law against law. 
“Surveillant assemblage” was operationalized as the extension of surveillance practices 
and capacities due to the issuance of a peace bond. Referring back to Haggerty and 
Ericson (2000), surveillance capacities are not limited to technological surveillance but 
also include human contact or “human labor” for the purposes of establishing an informal 
surveillance network (see Wilkinson and Lippert, 2011). Overall, this analysis examined 
the discourse of Canada’s peace bond regime to determine whether and how it fits with 
Ericson’s counter-law analytic.  
 The examination of practices drew from official texts from the Lori Dupont 
Inquest that occurred in Windsor, Ontario in 2007. This inquest resulted from Lori 
Dupont’s murder in 2005 and, as noted in the Toronto Star, “[t]he jury’s 
recommendations were widespread, targeting provincial ministries, the hospital, the 
Crown attorney’s office and several other public organizations” (The Canadian Press, 
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2007). Given the apparent influence of this inquest on various institutions, the practices it 
described were analyzed in direct relation to Ericson’s assertion that criminalization 
through counter-law I is particularly compelling after catastrophic failure in a risk 
management system for which the government is held responsible (Ericson, 2007a: 24). 
This examination also analyzed the discourses that resulted from the Dupont Inquest, 
particularly in relation to Bill 168. According to Workplace Violence News, “Bill 168, an 
act introduced by the government in April [2009] to amend Ontario’s Occupational 
Health and Safety Act, stems from jury recommendations that followed a coroner’s 
inquest into Dupont’s murder...” (Schmidt, 2009). The analysis of discourses included 
legislative debates, a pamphlet entitled Protecting Workers from Workplace Violence: 
What Employers Need to Know, and Bill 168 itself.   
 The final data source was official “Practice Memoranda” given to Crown 
prosecutors and published by the Ministry of the Attorney General. In response to a 
Freedom of Information (FOI) request, the ministry provided six memoranda that discuss 
the use of peace bonds in relation to high-risk offenders, sexual offences, domestic 
violence, and child abuse. Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act allows the request of information from public agencies that would normally not be 
available. Gathering data through FOI requests has helped illuminate details of practices 
that would rarely be uncovered and examined (see Walby and Lippert, 2012; Lippert and 
Walby, 2012). Accordingly, the analysis of these memoranda examined lesser-known 
practices that may reflect the fundamental tenets of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law 
analytic.           
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS 
Peace Bonds and the Politics of Uncertainty    
  Uncertainty is found to be embodied in several different aspects of peace bond 
discourse. One aspect is the fear of contingent harm. I say “contingent harm” because of 
the assumption present in nearly every pamphlet6 that fear of harm is what needs to be 
proven to obtain a peace bond, not actual harm. For example, as stated in the pamphlet 
Peace Bonds, published by the Canadian Resource Center for Victims of Crime, “[y]ou 
do not need to prove that an assault has been committed [to obtain a peace bond]” (2005: 
2). What is said to be needed in a peace bond application is evidence a complainant has 
“reasonable grounds” to fear that the respondent will cause him or her “personal injury” 
(Miller v. Miller, 1990: 250; R v. Budreo, 1998: 11)—no one knows whether this harm 
or “personal injury” will come to fruition, which can produce heightened feelings of 
uncertainty (see Sunstein, 2005). Further, the assumption that one’s fear is based on 
“reasonable grounds” is intriguing given the inherent irrationality vested in fear (see 
Davis, 1999). As stated by Greinacher, fear creates “...the intangible and often irrational 
motives behind our actions...” (1997: 281). The court in Budreo address this by 
deploying the assumption that:  
Fear alone connotes a state of belief or an apprehension that a future event, 
thought to be undesirable, may or will occur. But “on reasonable grounds” lends 
objectivity to the apprehension. In other words, the phrase “fears on reasonable 
grounds” in s. 810.1(1) connotes a reasonably based sense of apprehension about 
a future event (1998:18).  
 
                                                 The only pamphlet that does not make reference to this is “Creating a Safety Plan” presumably because its 
focus is on what to do after a peace bond has been given rather than on the peace bond itself.  
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This assumption suggests that fear under s. 810 is reasonable when it is based on 
objectivity. The court in Budreo emphasized that objectivity is based on “evidence” 
according to s. 810.1(3) (1998: 19). However, this assumption is questionable. It is 
unclear how fear can be based on evidential fact or “reasonable grounds” when, by its 
very nature, fear is “intangible” and “irrational.” Assaulted, Threatened, or Harassed is 
the only pamphlet that relates fear to another provision in the criminal law, criminal 
harassment. However, this does not clarify how an irrational fear is to be based on 
“reasonable grounds.” In all other places in the discourse, fear is only discussed in 
relation to s. 810.     
 The pamphlets also assume that contingent harm can be caused by anyone and, 
accordingly, peace bond applications can be filed against anyone the complainant fears. 
Although some pamphlets focus exclusively on potential harm from spouses and intimate 
partners7, while others focus on the threats and harassment from students and parents8, 
most pamphlets acknowledge more general sources of harm: For example, “[t]he person 
you fear may be a current or former partner, a co-worker, casual acquaintance or total 
stranger” (Peace Bonds: What to do if you are being threatened or harassed, 2010: 2)9. 
This broad list of potential harm doers also appeals to the politics of uncertainty—the 
assumption becomes: no one can be sure who may cause him or her harm, but if harm is 
feared, apply for a peace bond “...to protect the safety of others or property” (Peace 
Bonds prepared by the Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime, 2005: 1).  
                                                 Specifically, “Do you know a woman who is being abused?” “Assaulted, threatened, or harassed,” and 
“Peace Bonds” published by the Legal Information Society of Nova Scotia. “Teachers Rights” Also, see “Peace Bonds & Restraining Orders,” “For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining 
Orders,” “Peace Bonds” Prepared by the Canadian Resource Center for Victims of Crime,” and “Legal 
Options for Protection from Domestic Violence and Stalking.” 
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 Based on the assumption that nothing inherently criminal needs to happen to 
obtain a peace bond, a complainant is expected to base his or her “fear of harm” on the 
existence of threats. Several pamphlets have a tendency to deploy the assumption that 
filing a peace bond application is the appropriate action to take if you are being 
threatened or harassed. This assumption can be seen within several pamphlets10 and also 
in several titles on outside covers—for example, “Peace Bonds: What to do if you are 
being threatened or harassed” and “If you are being assaulted, threatened, or harassed, 
perhaps this pamphlet can help you decide what to do.” To deploy the assumption that a 
peace bond application is what to do if you are threatened or harassed contributes, at least 
in part, to the notion that peace bonds have the potential to alleviate one’s fear of harm. 
This notion is further supported by the pamphlet entitled “For Your Protection: Peace 
Bonds and Restraining Orders,” implying that peace bonds will protect applicants from 
their fears. Several pamphlets11 actually refer to peace bonds as “protection orders,” 
which are mean to “help protect one person from another” (Peace Bonds & Restraining 
Orders, 2011: 3). Ultimately, the discourse assumes that peace bonds require the potential 
harm-doer to “keep the peace and be of good behaviour.” Although this is stated in every 
pamphlet, none define what “keeping the peace” and “good behaviour” mean, only that a 
“freedom from fear” is achievable through them.  
 Despite the assumed potential peace bonds have to alleviate an applicant’s fears, 
the pamphlets still acknowledge the politics of uncertainty and the “...increasing doubt 
about the capacity of liberal governments to govern the future and provide security” 
                                                 Specifically, “Peace Bonds” from the Canadian Resource Center for Victims of Crime, “Teachers 
Rights,” “Peace Bonds” from the Legal Information Society of Nova Scotia, and “For Your Protection: 
Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders.”  Specifically, “For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders,” Peace Bonds & Restraining 
Orders,” and “Legal Options for Protection form Domestic Violence and Stalking.”  
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(Ericson, 2007a: 21). This is seen in the assumption that peace bonds may not prevent 
future harm. “By itself, a peace bond may not protect you from violence at the hands of 
the other person” (Peace Bonds: What to do if you are being threatened or harassed, 
2010: 3), “Peace bonds are not the perfect solution to ensuring safety” (Peace Bonds & 
Restraining Orders, 2011: 9), “...[peace bonds] cannot necessarily prevent anyone from 
breaking the law” (Peace Bonds Prepared by the Canadian Resource Center for Victims 
of Crime, 2005: 3), or “Any court order is not a guarantee of safety...” (Legal Options for 
Protection from Domestic Violence and Stalking, 2011: 2). Despite explicit 
acknowledgement of the politics of uncertainty, most pamphlets employ the logic of 
precaution shortly after the aforementioned assertions by urging readers to exercise 
caution and anticipate what one does not yet know (Ericson, 2007a: 21-4). For example, 
Legal Options for Protection from Domestic Violence and Stalking states, “[a]ny court 
order is not a guarantee of safety—a safety plan is your best defense. No matter what 
court orders you get, you still need a safety plan12” (2011: 2). As described in the 
pamphlet Creating a Safety Plan, safety planning “...involves identifying action steps to 
increase your safety, and to prepare in advance for the possibility of further violence” 
(2006: 1). Readers are advised to tell their neighbors, co-workers, and employers about 
the court order and the conditions therein (Creating a Safety Plan, 2006). The discourse 
also advises the reader that “[i]f the peace bond includes your children, you should also 
give a copy to anyone who is responsible for them when they are out of your care, such 
as their teachers, child care providers, coaches, or other instructors” (For Your 
Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders, 2007: 11). It is assumed that these 
                                                 Safety planning was also suggested in “Peace Bonds & Restraining Orders,” “Criminal Code Peace 
Bonds,” “Peace Bonds: What to do if you are being threatened or harassed,” and “Peace Bonds” published 
by the Legal Information Society of Nova Scotia.    
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people will ensure the safety of the complainant and/or his or her children and call the 
police if conditions listed in the peace bond are breached. However, one pamphlet 
deploys the assumption that even a safety plan may be uncertain: “Peace bonds are not 
the perfect solution to ensuring safety ...While not a guarantee of safety, having a safety 
plan or strategy for staying safe can help to increase your safety” (Peace Bonds & 
Restraining Orders, 2011: 9). Thus, although the effectiveness of both peace bonds and 
safety plans are uncertain to some extent, one’s safety is seen to be enhanced through an 
additional precautionary safety plan that attempts to act against what one does not yet 
know. Responsibility for creating the plan is placed squarely on the shoulders of the 
complainant and/or dependents.   
 Uncertainty is also reflected in the ambiguity of harm or “personal injury.” 
According to Ericson (2007a), a key component of anti-social behaviour legislation is 
that it is a source of uncertainty due to the “legal relativism” it creates. Specifically, the 
law is “[o]pen to the incorporation of any troublesome behavior [sic] as defined by the 
local politics of uncertainty...” (Ericson, 2007a: 211).  Like anti-social behavior 
legislation, peace bond discourse appears to create a similar “legal relativism” by 
referring to “personal injury” ambiguously. For example, in nine of the ten pamphlets13, 
“personal injury” is conceived in different ways: it is conceived as physical injury, 
namely to the complainant, the complainant’s children and/or the family pet(s); it is 
conceived as property damage; it is conceived as emotional damage14; and it is also 
                                                 
13 “Creating a Safety Plan” is the exception.  
14 Implied in the pamphlet “For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders” through the notion 
of one’s “right to feel safe.” 
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conceived as sexual assault15. The Criminal Code also uses a remarkably broad meaning 
of “personal injury” by creating four separate peace bond sections: s. 810, where injury 
or damage is feared; s. 810.1, where a sexual offence against a child is feared; s. 810.2, 
where a serious personal injury offence is feared; and s. 810. 01, where a “terrorist 
offence” or “criminal organization” is feared. This observation is similar to Neumann’s, 
who suggests that “[j]udicial interpretation of s. 810 has not produced any clear or 
consistent understanding of how...[personal injury] requirements are to be met” (1994: 
189).  Thus, uncertainty also seems to be created by the public literature and the criminal 
law, where categories of harm become ambiguous and “legal relativism” can take place.     
 In acting against the risk of contingent and ambiguous harm, the courts are seen to 
operate on a logic of precaution. Specifically, a peace bond “…is a preventive provision 
not a punitive provision. It aims not to punish past wrongdoing but to prevent future 
harm…” (R v. Budreo, 1998: 10). Similarly, the court in Miller v. Miller stated that “[t]he 
provisions of section 810 of the Criminal Code [sic]...are categorized as ‘preventative 
remedies’ designed to enable Provincial Court judges to bind persons to keep the peace 
where breaches of the peace may be anticipated” (1990: 252). Again, a criminal offence 
does not need to arise for respondents to be subject to a recognizance order restricting 
their liberty—only potential harm must be feared. This is the logic of precaution, where 
“[d]ecisions are therefore not made in a context of certainty, nor even of available 
knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, mistrust, fear and anxiety” (Ewald, 
2002: 294).  
 However, to confront uncertainty, the court deploys assumptions that embody the 
                                                 See “Peace Bonds” prepared by the Canadian Resource Center for Victims of Crime and its discussion of 
s. 810.1.  
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neo-liberal desire to act as if the future is knowable and governable (Ericson, 2007a). For 
example, according to the court in Budreo, the capacity to commit future harm can be 
determined based on a respondent’s past criminal record. Like most actuarial methods in 
criminal law, a criminal record is used to make predictions about the future criminality of 
respondents and plays a role in determining criminal justice outcomes for respondents 
based on their past (Harcourt, 2007: 17). Dealing particularly with fear of pedophilia, the 
court in Budreo stated, “[m]ore common, no doubt, will be cases where evidence will be 
led at the hearing concerning the individual's general proclivity to abuse children 
sexually. This could be based on a relevant criminal record and past behaviour around 
children” (1998: 14). Although it seems a prior criminal record would aid the court in 
establishing the future conduct of a respondent, the court does not require a criminal 
record to issue a peace bond. To require that the respondent needed to commit a criminal 
offence previously would hinder the court’s ability to act against the risk of future harm. 
The court in Budreo rationalized this by referring to a precautionary logic inherent in 
peace bond law: “Requiring a criminal record or some other offending conduct as a 
condition of a recognizance order under s. 810.1 is at odds with the preventive purpose of 
the section” (R v. Budreo, 1998: 14). Thus, it is suggested that prior conduct is not 
necessary for a s. 810.1 order. This assumption becomes more interesting when compared 
to an assertion made in the Internet document Peace Bonds, prepared by the Canadian 
Resource Centre for Victims of Crime, which refers to s. 810.1 as “pedophile peace 
bonds” (2005: 1). The term “pedophile” is a psychiatric construct, defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) as a Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorder that “...involves sexual activity with a prepubescent child” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000: 571). Unlike all other textual representations of specific 
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peace bond sections, the “pedophile peace bond” label inherent in the textual 
representation of s. 810.1 depends upon bringing psychiatric knowledge into the realm of 
legal knowledge: it assumes that those who are subject to a peace bond under s. 810.1 are 
pedophiles. However, according to the DSM-IV, to be diagnosed with “pedophilia” one 
must act on his or her sexual urges (Gieles, 2001). As assumed in Budreo, a criminal 
record is not required to be subject to a s. 810.1 order. Also, as shown above, the 
discourse assumes that peace bond applications focus on the fear of contingent harms, 
rather than the existence of actual harms. This illustrates the ability of peace bonds to 
criminalize based on an assumed status generated by the discourse. Namely, those subject 
to a s. 810.1 recognizance are pedophiles even when a formal diagnosis based on a 
pedophilic criminal offence may not exist.   
 Overall, the politics of uncertainty can be seen as an underlying element in 
Canada’s peace bond regime. Although peace bonds have been used to govern the 
behaviour of convicted offenders after they have served their whole sentence and are 
released to the community (Crawford, 2000), the discourse never assumes that peace 
bonds are a reactive response to crime. Rather, the discourse assumes that the uncertainty 
embodied in one’s fear of contingent and ambiguous harm should facilitate a 
precautionary logic. Ultimately, peace bonds are seen as preventive and not punitive. 
They are based on a pre-crime orientation (Zedner, 2007) that is rationalized through a 
precautionary desire to prevent harm. The issuance of a recognizance can be seen as a 
proactive strategy to govern risk, aimed at providing applicants with a “freedom from 
fear.”   
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Counter-law I: Law Against Law 
 In its quest to govern risk through the issuance of a peace bond, the criminal justice 
system must not let the limits of the law stand in its way. Traditional legal principles are 
eroded through the issuance of a peace bond. As stated by Ericson, a main element of law 
against law “...involves efforts to counter the traditional distinctions between the different 
legal forms of criminal, civil, and administrative law” (2007a: 25). Weakening traditional 
evidentiary burdens of proof not only counters traditional distinctions between criminal 
and civil forms of law, but also helps the state act against risk and uncertainty. Like the 
UK’s Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Crawford, 2009), Canada’s peace bond regime is 
found to reduce the criminal burden of “beyond a reasonable doubt” to the civil burden of 
“balance of probabilities.” This burden is assigned by the court in Miller v. Miller: “...the 
burden of proof on the prosecution on a section 810 application is not proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt but on a balance of probabilities” (1990: 254). The assignment of this 
burden has intriguing implications for this thesis. Peace bonds are found under criminal 
law where “[t]he burden of proof, at all times, remains upon the Crown to establish the 
guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt” (Cox, Lafontaine and Rondinelli, 2009: 5) 
and yet peace bond applications require a burden of proof used in civil court. The 
fundamental difference between these burdens can be illustrated as follows:  
...in a civil trial, where A is suing B for breach of contract, the burden of proof 
is upon A to establish that breach. In civil cases, the onus is simply on a 
balance of probabilities. The most vivid example of that onus is the tipping of 
scales slightly in favor of the person who has the burden. If A tips the scale in 
his favor, ever so slightly, he wins (Salhany, 1994: 161).     
 
However, in a criminal trial, “[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt may be described as 
being achieved when there is a moral certainty in your mind...” (R v. Brydon, 1995: 7). 
While a balance of probabilities “tips the scale,” beyond a reasonable doubt topples the 
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scale by relying more on “moral certainty” than “probability.” Thus, based on these 
definitions and illustrations, it can be argued that by countering traditional distinctions 
between civil and criminal forms of law, criminalization through the issuance of a peace 
bond becomes easier when burdens of proof are lowered.  
 The court in Miller v. Miller provided four reasons for its assignment of the 
burden “balance of probabilities” to peace bond hearings:  
1. Proceedings under section 810 are at best quasi-criminal in nature and even 
where there is a finding that the accused is required to enter into a 
recognizance this is not a conviction and no penalty follows directly there 
from. 
 
2. The wording of section 810 of the Criminal Code [sic] is to the effect that 
an application can be taken out by any person “who fears”, and that the court 
must be satisfied on the evidence adduced that the applicant has “reasonable 
grounds for his fears”. The use of the words “fears”, “satisfied”, and 
“reasonable grounds” do not suggest the same severity or significant degree of 
proof attendant upon the prosecution in bona fide criminal proceedings.  
 
3. While it may be argued that a respondent entering into a recognizance has 
his liberty restricted, or that a very real consequence will result to those 
directed to but who refuse to enter into a recognizance, essentially the 
existence of a recognizance is no penalty or burden for a respondent to bear, 
simply because he is only binding himself to do what all law-abiding citizens 
are required to do. It is true that he attracts the risk of further penalty for 
breaching the peace or failing to be of good behaviour but this is not such an 
unreasonable burden or expectation for him, such that his exposure to it should 
be supportable only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
4. The recognizance contemplated by section 810 of the Criminal Code [sic] 
may be in form 32 of the Criminal Code [sic] and this is the type of form 
suggested as being the form of a recognizance to be entered into by a person 
released by the court under the judicial interim release [or bail] provisions is 
not beyond a reasonable doubt but on a balance of probabilities. Hence, it 
would follow a fortiori that the burden contemplated by section 810 of the 
Criminal Code [sic] is on the same standard, proof on a balance of 
probabilities (Miller v. Miller, 1990: 254-5).                
 
With these reasons considered, three are based on assumptions that are called into 
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question by the broader peace bond discourse16. First, reason 1 is based on the assumption 
that proceedings under s. 810 are “...at best quasi-criminal in nature.” If s. 810 
proceedings were intended to be quasi-criminal, then peace bonds would presumably be 
codified under a quasi-criminal law like a provincial regulation. However, as stated by 
every pamphlet, peace bonds are found under s. 810 of the Criminal Code, which implies 
regular criminal proceedings are to be undertaken. Further, as stated in Criminal Code 
Peace Bonds, “..the application [for a peace bond] is heard in criminal court by a 
provincial court judge” (2010: 1 emphasis added). This assumption also implies that 
regular criminal proceedings are to be undertaken. Intriguingly, legal scholars associate 
“quasi-criminal” proceedings more with “public torts” and civil law than with criminal 
law (e.g. Devlin, 1965; Parker, 1983; O’Connell, 1993; Stoffelmayr and Diamond, 2000). 
The notion “quasi-criminal” creates confusion and erodes traditional distinctions between 
forms of criminal and civil law. Overall, the assumption deployed in reason 1 is called 
into question by the broader peace bond discourse.   
 Second, reason 2 is based on the assumption that “...the words ‘fears’, ‘satisfied’, 
and ‘reasonable grounds’ do not suggest the same severity...as bona fide criminal 
proceedings.” This assumption is confronted by another assumption deployed in the 
pamphlet Assaulted, threatened, or harrassed?, suggesting that “[i]n many situations if 
you have grounds for a peace bond, you have grounds for a criminal complaint” (2010: 
3). This statement assumes that, in many cases, one’s “reasonable grounds” for “fear” in a 
peace bond application are as severe as a bona fide criminal proceeding, thereby calling 
                                                 Reason 4 was not met with opposing assumptions in the discourse. However, I would submit that it is 
illogical to assume that because peace bonds “may be in form 32 of the Criminal Code ” that peace bonds 
are necessarily in form 32 and, based on this possible association, justifies peace bond hearings mimicking 
bail hearings. However, a logical appeal to legal reasoning may be given less weight given that “...the life 
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience” (R v. Budreo, 1998: 13).            
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reason 2 from Miller v. Miller into question.  
 Third, reason 3 assumes that “...the existence of a recognizance is no penalty or 
burden for a respondent to bear, simply because he is only binding himself to do what all 
law-abiding citizens are required to do.” When one examines assumptions in the 
discourse, however, the conditions that can be imposed in a recognizance under s. 810 
seem to go beyond “what all law-abiding citizens are required to do.” Conditions can 
include “prohibiting the defendant from being at, or within a distance specified in the 
recognizance...[which may include a distance from the applicant’s] common-law partner 
or child...[to] report to a probation officer...[to] complete any treatment or counseling that 
may be directed...[and] abstain from possessing or using any alcohol...” (Criminal Code 
Peace Bonds, 2010: 22-3); to stay away from the applicant’s “...place of work, or place of 
worship; [to] not contact [the applicant’s] friends or family members” (Assaulted, 
threatened, or harassed?, 2010: 4); and to not attempt to contact the applicant indirectly 
through sending friends or family text or email messages (Peace Bonds published by the 
Legal Information Society of Nova Scotia, 2007: 2). Thus, the assumptions used by the 
court in Miller v. Miller to justify its decision to assign the civil burden of “balance of 
probabilities” to peace bond hearings are confronted by those assumptions deployed in 
the broader peace bond discourse. This confrontation supports the notion that counter-law 
I has a tendency to reform criminal law without strong and principled justifications 
(Ericson, 2007a: 25). The reduced burden that these weak reasons justify represents a law 
against law through an erosion of traditional distinctions between criminal and civil forms 
of law. A notable observation about the discourse is that the pamphlets never highlighted 
this lowered burden of proof. Acknowledging this lower burden could conceivably 
illustrate how a peace bond can ease criminalization, provide security to the complainant, 
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and aid political authorities in preempting imagined sources of harm—all of which are 
main components of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law analytic. Since peace bonds can be 
seen as a form of counter-law, I was surprised to find a lacking acknowledgment of this 
lower burden in the pamphlets. However, in reference to other aspects of the discourse, 
there seems to be several more instances where traditional principles of criminal law are 
eroded under a s. 810 application.  
 Under the Charter, s. 7 guarantees “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice.” Of particular importance are the “principles of 
fundamental justice,” which have been established to ensure due process and trial fairness 
(Sharpe and Roach, 2009: 228-9). In effect, if one’s liberty is to be limited by the state 
through a peace bond order, then this liberty restriction must be aligned with the 
traditional principles of due process and trial fairness. However, the analysis so far 
suggests that fulfilling these principles might be problematic. First, as suggested in the 
previous section, peace bond applications are based on the perceived existence of threats. 
Specifically, Do you know a woman who is being abused?, Peace Bonds prepared by the 
Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime, and For Your Protection: Peace Bonds 
and Restraining Orders encourage the reader to document threats made by the respondent 
to help prove the reader’s fear in court. In relation to a s. 810.1 order, it is assumed that 
“…evidence may be led that the defendant has made a threat or sexual proposition to a 
specific child or a group of children” to justify one’s fear at trial (R v. Budreo, 1998: 13). 
However, threats are inherently problematic when relied upon as evidence of future 
conduct. As suggested by Ericson, intent to act upon a threat cannot be proven because 
threats are based on an unknown future (2007a: 157). This results in an erosion of the 
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mens rea principle, which is a fundamental component of trial fairness under the 
“principles of fundamental justice” (MacIvor, 2006: 308). Ultimately, mens rea is 
replaced by what Ericson calls finus reus—when criminalization appears necessary, no 
other justification is needed (2007: 48). Again, a liberty restriction based on a reasonable 
fear that is proven without the element of mens rea can be conceptualized as a violation 
of the Charter and, most importantly, a law against law.  
 Second, the court in Budreo suggested that the traditional exclusionary rule of 
hearsay evidence does not necessarily apply at a peace bond hearing: “…the ‘evidence’ 
the judge relies on might include hearsay…” (1998: 15). Hearsay evidence has been 
traditionally excluded due to its lack of reliability (Roach, 2004; R v. Khelawon, 2006). 
This unreliability is vested in “...a recognition of the difficulty for a trier of fact to assess 
what weight, if any, is to be given to a statement made by a person who has not been seen 
or heard, and who has not been subject to the test of cross-examination” (R v. Khelawon, 
2006: 25). However, trial fairness may be hindered through the use of traditionally 
unreliable evidence to justify a liberty restriction under a peace bond order. This 
ultimately erodes a “principle of fundamental justice” and, in turn, s. 7 of the Charter. 
Even if a judge deems the evidence “credible” or “trustworthy” and trial fairness is 
supposedly maintained, the admission of hearsay is still an erosion of the traditional 
evidentiary principle that excludes it. Thus, a liberty restriction based on hearsay in a 
peace bond hearing can be conceptualized, not only as a potential violation of traditional 
legal principles contained in the Charter, but also as a law against law that erodes 
traditional principles of evidence.  
 Facilitated by the erosion of traditional criminal law principles, proving that a 
complainant is fearful of a respondent under s. 810 can result in the expansion of the 
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state’s capacity to criminalize through potential recognizance breaches. An assumption 
deployed by all the pamphlets is that if a condition listed in a peace bond is breached, 
then punitive criminal charges will follow. All the pamphlets advise the reader that peace 
bonds alone do not result in a criminal record. However, if a peace bond is breached17, 
the defendant “...will have a criminal record and may also be: placed on probation for up 
to three years, fined up to $2,000.00, and/or sent to jail for up to six months” (For Your 
Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders, 2007: 12). One can be charged with a 
recognizance breach by, for example, merely being present at the home of the 
complainant (For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders, 2007: 18). 
Assumed to be an “advantage of peace bonds” (Do you know a woman who is being 
abused?, 2004: 34), this process can be seen as an expansion of the state’s capacity to 
criminalize risky populations where nothing inherently criminal needs to occur. Further, 
the ability to enforce a peace bond breach under s. 811 of the Criminal Code alters the 
practices of Crown attorneys. A practice memorandum that was incorporated in the 
Crown Policy Manual as of March 31st, 2006 instructs prosecutors in the province of 
Ontario that “[w]here there are concerns about the safety of the victim, Crown counsel 
should endeavor to obtain a peace bond pursuant to section 810, rather than obtaining a 
common law peace bond18” (Practice Memorandum: Spouse/Partner Offences: 
Miscellaneous Issues, 2002: 5). When a peace bond under s. 810 is breached, a person 
can be charged criminally under s. 811. Common law peace bonds cannot be enforced 
                                                 Which requires having a peace bond placed against a person in the first place, thus subjecting only those 
who have one against them to a possibility of breaching.  A common law peace bond is a recognizance ordered by a judge under his or her common law 
jurisdiction. A complainant cannot apply for one under s. 810. Since this was the only instance where the 
data mentioned a common law peace bond, they were not included in this analysis.    
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under the Criminal Code19. It is implicitly assumed in the memorandum that possible 
criminalization under s. 811 will enhance the safety of the victim. However, it is also 
implicitly assumed that by pursuing a peace bond under s. 810 over the common law 
counterpart, more people can now be criminalized under s. 811. Thus, peace bonds under 
s. 810 can be seen as an expansion in the state’s capacity to criminalize risky populations. 
 As mentioned by Ericson, criminalization through counter-law I is particularly 
compelling after a catastrophic failure in a risk management system for which the 
government is held responsible (2007a: 24). Under Canada’s peace bond regime, an 
example of this can be seen in the Lori Dupont case that occurred in Windsor, Ontario. 
Lori Dupont, a registered nurse working at the Hotel-Dieu Grace Hospital recovery room, 
had a romantic relationship with Marc Daniel, an anesthesiologist working in the 
operating room in close proximity to Ms. Dupont. Lori tried to end the relationship but 
Mr. Daniel pursued her relentlessly inside and outside the workplace. This prompted Ms. 
Dupont to apply for a peace bond against Mr. Daniel in April of 2005. Unfortunately, the 
peace bond hearing did not occur within a seven-month span and Mr. Daniel murdered 
Ms. Dupont and then took his own life on November 12, 2005 (Schmidt, 2006). This 
resulted in an investigation of several agencies, including the Ministry of the Attorney 
General and its peace bond procedure in cases where domestic violence is feared. Some 
of the blame was eventually assigned to lawyers because of the untimely manner in which 
peace bond applications were reviewed. To combat this, The Coroner’s Jury made eight 
recommendations for the Ministry of the Attorney General in 2007, but most notably:  
14. The MAG [Ministry of the Attorney General] should ensure that in each 
jurisdiction in Ontario, a protocol exists between Court Administration offices 
and the Crown Attorney’s office which will ensure that details of each peace 
                                                 A Crown prosecutor disclosed this information to me during an informal conversation.  
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bond application (s. 810 application) made to the court, with a component of 
domestic violence, is brought to the attention of the Crown Attorney’s office 
within one working day
 
18. Throughout Ontario, the Attorney General should ensure that there are 
dedicated domestic violence courts, which focus on early intervention and 
vigorous prosecution… (Dupont Inquest, 2007: 7).  
 
These recommendations assume that the Ontario government will expedite 
criminalization under Canada’s peace bond regime. The practices recommended by the 
Dupont Inquest suggest that the “procedural delays” discussed by Neumann (1994) are 
now a less relevant concern for peace bond applicants. Since the release of this inquest 
report in 2007, statistics indicate that more people in Ontario seem to be relying on peace 
bonds to alleviate their fears (see Table 1 in Appendix A). Raw numbers have increased 
from 2007 to 2010 compared to those from 2003 to 2006. An average of 80% of all peace 
bond applications have been granted to fearful complainants in the province of Ontario in 
the years following the Dupont Inquest20. What is also interesting is the increased number 
of criminal trials that have resulted in s. 810 peace bond orders where no peace bond 
applications were initially filed (see Table 3 in Appendix A). This is interesting because 
official Practice Memoranda explicitly advise Crown Attorney’s against dropping 
criminal charges to peace bond applications, particularly in domestic related cases: 
“Peace bonds must not be used as an alternative remedy to criminal charges in 
spouse/partner offences” (Practice Memorandum: Spouse/Partner Offences: 
Miscellaneous Issues, 2002: 5). These statistics suggest that criminal justice actors seem 
more compelled to rely on peace bonds to criminalize since this mass failure. This 
                                                 To calculate the average number of peace bond applications granted after the Dupont Inquest, I simply 
added the raw numbers of total peace bond applications filed between 2007-2010 from Table 1 and used 
this sum as a denominator. I then added the raw numbers of total peace bond applications granted between 
2007-2010 from Table 2 and used this sum as a numerator. I divided the numerator by the denominator and 
converted the result to a percentage (e.g. 30963/38499=0.80 or 80%).      
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supports Ericson’s notion that criminalization through counter-law I is particularly 
compelling after a catastrophic failure in a risk management system for which the 
government is held responsible (2007a: 24). Thus, with an assumed expedited peace bond 
regime, it appears that both the public and the criminal justice system in Ontario are 
relying increasingly on peace bonds to address the fear of uncertain victimization.    
 As stated earlier, the recommendations made during the Dupont Inquest were 
considered to be “widespread.” Other precautionary and risk based legal reform resulted 
from the Coroner’s Jury. Perhaps the most notable result was Bill 168, An Act to amend 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act (2009), that, according to Workplace Violence 
News, “...stems from jury recommendations that followed a coroner’s inquest into 
Dupont’s murder...” (Schmidt, 2009). In his speech during the second reading of the bill 
to the legislature, the Honorable Peter Fonseca—Minister of Labour—stated that under 
this bill “employers would better understand their responsibilities, and workers their 
rights, in preventing workplace violence and addressing harassment” (Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario, 2009: 41). Mr. Fonseca noted that this bill would require that “[i]f 
an employer becomes aware, or ought reasonably to be aware, that domestic violence that 
would likely expose a worker to physical injury may occur in the workplace, the 
employer shall take every precaution reasonable in the circumstance for the protection of 
the worker” (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 2009: 41). Under Bill 168, “workplace 
violence” can be interpreted as “a statement or behaviour that it is reasonable for a worker 
to interpret as a threat to exercise physical force against a worker, in a workplace, that 
could cause physical injury to the worker.” Intriguingly, this definition seems to rely on a 
politics of uncertainty that is similar to the politics of uncertainty inherent in peace bonds. 
Like the fear of contingent harm, “workplace violence” is based on threats of harm, which 
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may not come to fruition, but is feared by other workers. The bill also focuses attention 
on the governance of risk through assessment and control—found under s. 32.0.2 and s. 
32.0.3. A pamphlet published by the Occupational Health and Safety Council of Ontario 
entitled Protecting Workers from Workplace Violence: What Employers Need to Know 
deploys the assumption that employers will “[a]ssess the risks of workplace violence that 
may arise from the nature of the workplace or the type and conditions of work. Include 
measures and procedures in the workplace violence program to control the risks” (2010: 
4). Risk assessment not only seeks to keep employees safe, but as assumed by Mr. 
Fonseca, also helps businesses: “Preventing injuries and absences translates into...reduced 
lost-time injuries and reduced workplace insurance premiums and costs” (Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario, 2009: 42). Referring back to Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law 
analytic, we see both the politics of uncertainty and logic of precaution hard at work. 
Based on the uncertain possibility of “workplace violence,” employers are responsibilized 
to “take every precaution reasonable” by assessing and controlling risks to keep 
employees safe and insurance premiums down. It appears that the Dupont inquest offers 
some evidence to substantiate Ericson’s notion that mass failures in risk management 
systems often result in new or reinvented counter-law regimes (2007a: 24). Perhaps future 
research should examine if Bill 168 erodes traditional principles of criminal law to act 
against uncertain “workplace violence.”  
 Overall, based on the assumptions deployed in the discourse, it appears that peace 
bonds take the form of a law against law. Legal aspects associated with peace bonds can 
be seen to erode traditional principles of law embodied in distinctions between criminal 
and civil forms of law, due process and trial fairness, and rules of evidence. Further, 
peace bonds can also be seen to exhibit other aspects of a law against law. Specifically, 
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the Lori Dupont Coroner’s Inquest offers some evidence to substantiate Ericson’s (2007a) 
notion that mass failures in risk management systems often result in a more compelling 
counter-law regime. Since the inquest, more Ontarians are relying on peace bond 
applications to alleviate their fears, a high number of applications are being ordered by 
courts in Ontario, and Ontario’s criminal justice system has increasingly relied on peace 
bonds as an alternative to other criminal charges. Thus, not only do peace bonds appear to 
erode traditional principles of law, they also seem to embody several other aspects of 
Ericson’s (2007a) conceptualization of a law against law.  
Counter Law II: Surveillant Assemblage 
 The extension of surveillance practices and capacities due to the issuance of a peace 
bond can be seen from two perspectives. First, the extension of surveillance practices is 
seen through the use of technological surveillance. Although one may not receive a 
criminal record solely by entering into a peace bond, the issuance and conditions of the 
order are still recorded in a database. Specifically, in Ontario, it is assumed that “once a 
peace bond is ordered, the court sends it to the police and it is entered on the police 
computer system. This makes it easier for the police to confirm that there is a peace bond 
to enforce”  (Do you know a woman who is being abused?, 2004: 34). Official Practice 
Memoranda in Ontario instruct Crown prosecutors to advise the Deputy Director of High-
Risk Offenders at the Crown Law Office (DD-HRO) of peace bonds ordered under s. 
810.1 and s. 810.2. According to the memoranda, as part of a National Flagging Program, 
“[s]uch offenders will be flagged on CPIC [Canadian Police Information Center database] 
as a high-risk offender” (Practice Memorandum, 2008: 4). Other provinces also assume 
that police notification under Canada’s peace bond regime is national. For example,  
“[t]hrough a Canada-wide computer system, the police in any province or territory can 
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contact the British Columbia Protection Order Registry to confirm the terms of the peace 
bond, and act to enforce it” (For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders, 
2007: 13). Thus, even when a criminal offence has not materialized, the police are 
presumably informed of a peace bond through their computer network to ease 
enforcement of the order’s stipulated conditions.  
 Canada’s peace bond regime can be seen to extend technological police notification 
into the realm of uncertainty. Notification-driven police surveillance is usually based on 
criminal offending. For example, sex offender registry and notification under Megan’s 
Law is based on a sex offender’s criminal conduct (Finn, 1997) and is established to 
prevent “risky” sex offenders from reoffending (Simon, 1998). However, police 
notification under Canada’s peace bond regime is quite different—police are notified 
even when a criminal offence has not been committed. As shown previously21, the 
discourse assumes that a criminal record is not required to order a peace bond, nor is the 
commission of a criminal offence needed to obtain an order from the court. Thus, based 
on the uncertainty of whether a respondent will breach a condition of a peace bond, 
notification driven police surveillance under Canada’s peace bond regime is extended to 
situations where no criminal conduct has occurred.  
 The second perspective is based on the extension of surveillance capacities through 
community notification and supervision. Referring back to Haggerty and Ericson (2000), 
the surveillance capacities of an assemblage are not limited to technological surveillance 
but also include human contact or “human labor” for the purposes of establishing an 
                                                 Based on the assumptions deployed in R v. Budreo, “Do you know a woman who is being abused?”, 
“Peace Bonds” prepared by the Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime, and “For Your Protection: 
Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders”.
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informal surveillance network (see Wilkinson and Lippert, 2012). One notable 
observation is that some pamphlets assume that police play a passive role in peace bond 
enforcement: “...the police will probably not take action unless you ask them to” (Peace 
Bonds published by the Legal Information Society Of Nova Scotia, 2007: 10)22. 
Accordingly, peace bond enforcement is expected to rely, at least to some extent, on 
community notification and supervision to ensure conditions are followed and police are 
contacted if a condition is breached. However, community notification under a peace 
bond regime differs from community notification under, for example, a sex offender 
registry. Although community notification under a sex offender registry has been seen as 
a national problem rather than a communal problem (Levi, 2000), community notification 
in a peace bond situation can be seen as a community problem, and a particular 
community at that. Unlike Megan’s Law, where notification is given by police officers 
directly while on patrol and through a request for information from the state for a small 
fee (Finn, 1997; Smith, 1998), complainants under a peace bond regime are mobilized to 
notify their neighbors, employers, and fellow employees of the conditions of a peace 
bond so the community can call the police in the event that a condition has been 
breached23. Notification is also encouraged at other sites: for example, “If the peace bond 
includes your children, you should also give a copy to anyone who is responsible for them 
when they are out of your care, such as their teachers, child care providers, coaches, or 
other instructors. Tell them to call the police if your partner or ex-partner does not follow 
the conditions in the peace bond” (For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining 
                                                 
22 Police passivity was also suggested in “Peace Bonds,” prepared by the Canadian Resource Centre for 
Victims of Crime, and “Assaulted, threatened, or harassed?”   
23 Found in “For Your Protection: Peace Bonds and Restraining Orders,” “Peace Bonds & Restraining 
Orders,” and “Creating a Safety Plan.” 
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Orders, 2007: 11). Similar to managing risks associated with “date rape drugs,” these 
“trusted friends” are mobilized as a collective risk-monitoring strategy to protect the 
complainant from potential harm (Moore and Valverde, 2000: 525-26). However, 
community notification and supervision under Canada’s peace bond regime is not 
unilateral, it may also mobilize the defendant and his or her “trusted friends.” 
Specifically, a judge may order that the defendant post an amount of money and obtain a 
surety. A surety is “...a person who vouches for the defendant and agrees to supervise him 
or her to make sure the conditions are obeyed” (Peace bonds published by the Legal 
Information Society of Nova Scotia, 2007: 7). This form of community notification and 
supervision constitutes an informal surveillance network where human contact is used for 
the purposes of establishing a node of an assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000).
 The discourse ultimately suggested that information sharing under this notification 
system rely on a mobilized public and their capacity to police themselves. Under 
Canada’s peace bond regime, the private community—charged with ensuring the 
complainant’s security—are assumed to report breaches and mobilize the public police by 
providing them with intelligence about the respondent’s whereabouts based on their 
knowledge of conditions stipulated in a peace bond. The assemblage is both panoptic and 
synoptic: it seeks to discipline the respondent while also allowing a number of people to 
focus on the respondent to ensure the complainant’s safety and, in turn, security 
(Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 607, 618). Also, as assumed in the document “Peace 
Bonds,” prepared by the Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime, the network’s 
synopticism can also be used to scrutinize public officials: “It is important to note that the 
police may not always respond positively in enforcing peace bonds. If the officer 
responding to your call does not provide an effective remedy, you should talk to his/her 
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supervisor” (2005: 3). Haggerty and Ericson suggest that the ability to scrutinize public 
officials is an element inherent in the synoptic capacity of a surveillant assemblage (2000: 
618). The discourse assumes that private members of the community will share 
information with the public police in the event of a peace bond breach. This network can 
also be conceptualized as synoptic and used to scrutinize public officials, thereby 
exhibiting multiple aspects of a surveillant assemblage.  
 Overall, surveillance through a peace bond order can be seen to extend police and 
community notification and supervision into a realm where a criminal conviction is not 
registered. Rationalized through a precautionary logic to prevent uncertain harm, police 
databases are presumably updated and “trusted friends” are presumably mobilized to 
ensure the safety of the complainant and his or her children. Community notification and 
supervision may also mobilize the defendant and his or her “trusted friends” through the 
acquisition of a surety to ensure the conditions of the peace bond are obeyed. If the 
conditions are broken, the public presumably mobilizes the police to charge the defendant 
with a recognizance breach.       
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law analytic guided this thesis by raising the question: 
how and to what extent are peace bonds a form of counter-law? However, the answer to 
this question has two parts. To answer, “how are peace bonds a form of counter-law?” I 
will summarize the findings of this thesis to illustrate how each tenet of Ericson’s 
counter-law analytic are reflected in the discourse. To answer, “to what extent are peace 
bonds a form of counter-law?” I will summarize the different aspects embodied in each 
tenet of Ericson’s analytic that the discourse addresses. This answer will also discuss 
aspects of Ericson’s analytic that are not embodied in peace bond discourse.  
How are peace bonds a form of counter-law? 
 Peace bonds are a form of counter-law because their representations in the 
discourse exhibit the tenets of Ericson’s (2007a) counter-law analytic. Under the tenet 
“politics of uncertainty,” this analysis searched the discourse for assertions that dealt with 
a complainant’s fear of crime, the possibility of future victimization, and how peace 
bonds can facilitate a “freedom from fear” through a potential capacity to prevent crime. 
The analysis found that fear of harm is what needs to be proven to obtain a peace bond, 
not actual harm. The possibility of future victimization was exhibited through the 
pamphlets acknowledgement that peace bonds may not prevent future harm. 
Assumptions about safety planning appear to facilitate, at least in part, the possibility of a 
“freedom from fear.” This freedom is further enhanced through the assumption that peace 
bonds have the capacity to protect the applicant if they are being threatened or harassed. 
This was implied through pamphlet text and titles, and through the notions of protection, 
peacekeeping, and good behaviour. Thus, the peace bond discourse deploys assertions 
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dealing with a complainant’s fear of crime, the possibility of future victimization, and 
how peace bonds can facilitate a “freedom from fear” through a potential capacity to 
prevent crime, thereby reflecting Ericson’s (2007a) notion of the “politics of 
uncertainty.”   
 Second, “law against law” was operationalized in relation to traditional legal 
principles that, according to Ericson, seem to be embodied in distinctions between forms 
of law and principles of evidence (2007a: 25). However, I also included those principles 
reflected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Legal aspects associated with 
peace bonds that acted contrary to an aforementioned traditional legal principle were 
deemed a law against law. This thesis’ analysis suggested that peace bonds erode three 
traditional principles of law. First, peace bonds erode distinctions between criminal and 
civil forms of law by reducing the traditional criminal burden of “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” to the civil burden of “balance of probabilities.” Second, due process and trial 
fairness are also eroded under Canada’s peace bond regime. This is done through a 
dependence on threats and traditionally unreliable evidence. Since s. 810 relies on the 
existence of threats, the mens rea principle is eroded. As stated by Ericson, intent to act 
upon a treat cannot be proven because their execution is based in an uncertain future 
(2007a: 157). Further, a reliance on traditionally unreliable hearsay evidence at a peace 
bond hearing can also be seen to erode the principles of trial fairness and due process. 
This reliance not only violates s. 7 of the Charter, but also creates a law against law. 
Finally, peace bonds erode traditional rules of evidence through the use of hearsay. 
Although an increased reliance on hearsay evidence does seem to be a recent trend in 
 44
Canadian law24, the assumption deployed by the court in Budreo justifying its use during 
peace bond hearings erodes the traditional exclusionary rule of hearsay evidence.       
 Finally, the extension of surveillance practices and capacities due to the issuance of 
a peace bond can be seen from two perspectives. First, technological police notification 
under a peace bond can be seen as an extension of existing surveillance practices. Unlike 
technological police notification under Megan’s Law, which is based on a sex offender’s 
criminal conduct (Finn, 1997), notification-driven police surveillance under Canada’s 
peace bond regime is extended into the realm of uncertainty. Police databases are updated 
with information about the conditions and issuance of a peace bond when a criminal 
offence may not have actually occurred. Second, community notification and supervision 
extends surveillance capacities through the use of human contact for the purposes of 
establishing a node of an assemblage (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). Complainants under 
a peace bond regime are mobilized to notify neighbors, employers, fellow employees, and 
others of the conditions of a peace bond so the community can call the police in the event 
that a condition has been breached. In conclusion, surveillance through a peace bond 
order can be seen to extend police and community notification and supervision into a 
realm where “personal injury” is feared but a criminal conviction may not be registered.     
 Overall, the analysis of peace bond discourse has captured the tenets of Ericson’s 
(2007a) counter-law analytic that are present in the texts. After illustrating that the results 
of this thesis’ discourse analysis fits with the operationalization of each tenet of Ericson’s 
analytic, it can be concluded that peace bonds are a form of counter-law. The extent to 
which peace bonds form a counter-law will be discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
24 For example, the Supreme Court in Khelawon stated that “.a hearsay statement may be admitted if, 
because of the way in which it came about, its contents are trustworthy, or if circumstances permit the 
ultimate trier of fact to sufficiently assess its worth” (2006: 9-10). 
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To what extent are peace bonds a form of counter-law? 
  This section will discuss two things: the different aspects embodied in each tenet of 
Ericson’s analytic that the discourse addresses, and the aspects that are not embodied in 
peace bond discourse. Examining these elements will also integrate the self-reflexive 
component of qualitative research into this thesis. A researcher maintains self-reflexivity 
by “paying attention to ones place in the discourses and practices that are being analyzed” 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2008: 566). I will maintain this component of qualitative research 
by acknowledging my assumptions and impressions of the discourse in relation to the 
results of this thesis’ analysis.  
 A main element of Ericson’s framework is that counter-law exists to confront 
uncertainty by eroding existing laws and traditional legal principles that “...get in the way 
of preempting imagined sources of harm” (2007a: 24). Accordingly, I had assumed to see 
a more explicit acknowledgement of s. 810’s ability to confront uncertainty in the 
discourse. Although the ability of peace bonds to provide a “freedom from fear” is 
implied through pamphlet titles, text, and the assumed purpose of s. 810, the discourse 
never explicitly suggests that peace bonds will effectively confront the risk of harm one 
fears. However, the reintroduction of uncertainty in the discourse can be seen to support a 
different aspect of the politics of uncertainty. Precautionary measures such as counter-law 
are implemented “...for political authorities to try to maintain the upper hand in the 
politics of uncertainty” (Ericson, 2007a: 24). Political authorities need to maintain the 
upper hand in the politics of uncertainty because they are charged with acting as if the 
future is knowable and governable to ensure the security of the population (Ericson, 
2007a: 21). When the discourse acknowledges that peace bonds may not prevent future 
harm, the suggestion of a precautionary safety plan assumes to enterprise the complainant 
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to govern his or her own risk of future harm. In this way, political authorities maintain the 
upper hand in the politics of uncertainty by downloading the responsibility of governing 
risk to the complainant. By appealing to neo-liberalism, political authorities do not 
assume responsibility for future harm but rather use uncertainty as “...a source of creative 
enterprise” (Ericson, 2007a: 5). Complainants provide themselves with a “freedom from 
fear” by creating their own safety plan. Accordingly, this aspect of the politics of 
uncertainty appeals to its neo-liberal component and highlights a different way in which 
political authorities maintain the upper hand in relation to uncertainty.  
 Peace bonds are an extensive form of counter-law. The results of the discourse 
analysis supported additional aspects of law against law that were included in Ericson’s 
(2007a) work. For example, criminalization through counter-law is said to be more 
compelling after a mass failure in existing risk management systems (Ericson, 2007a: 24). 
The Lori Dupont inquest represented a mass failure that resulted in a more compelling 
counter-law regime. Since the Coroner’s Inquest was released in 2007, the courts and the 
people of Ontario have relied more heavily on peace bonds to criminalize individuals who 
cause fear (see Appendix A).  
 At this point, a counter argument must be addressed. According to the discourse, a 
peace bond order does not result in a recorded criminal conviction. To imply that peace 
bonds “criminalize” individuals who cause fear through a formal criminal conviction is 
not supported by this study. This anticipated counter argument highlights a criticism of 
Ericson’s work. Although Ericson seems to employ the term “criminalization” freely to 
describe the affects of counter-laws, he never conceptualizes the concept. The confusion 
this causes is evident, not only in the case of peace bonds, but also in Ericson’s own 
discussion of anti-social behaviour laws. According to Ericson, anti-social behaviour laws 
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“...criminalize a potentially unlimited range of imagined sources of harm...” (2007a: 158). 
However, like peace bonds, laws of anti-social behaviour only “criminalize” through a 
criminal conviction after their conditions are breached (Ericson, 2007a: 160; Crawford, 
2009: 817-18). Consequentially, the reader is left wondering what is meant by 
“criminalization” in the literature.  
 According to Mosher and Brockman (2010), the confusion surrounding 
“criminalization” is vested in the term’s ambiguity. The authors highlight three ways that 
criminalization can be understood. First, criminalization can refer to a particular category 
of behaviour that is defined by legislation as undesirable. An individual is “criminalized 
through categorization” when they have broken a law and a formal criminal conviction 
results (Mosher and Brockman, 2010: 3). Second, criminalization can refer to the 
deployment of “crime” and crime control. “Criminalization through law in action” is done 
when resources, enforcement practices, and surveillance are selectively deployed based 
on a particular type of person, whose acts become problematized and, in turn, 
criminalized (Mosher and Brockman, 2010: 8-9). This notion of criminalization is 
illustrated by Mosher and Hermer, who argue that a plethora of investigative tools have 
been deployed to combat the misuse of social assistance in Ontario. This resulted in the 
criminalization of welfare recipients through constructing their actions as “fraud” even 
when most misuses of social assistance lack intent to deprive another and are simply due 
to ignorance of the rules (2010: 32). Finally, criminalization can also refer to “governing 
through crime” (see Simon, 2007). As stated by Mosher and Brockman, “In our current 
neo-liberal society wherein hierarchy, order, and self-responsibilization are integral 
features, governing through crime is centered upon the attempt to identify or predict risky 
situations or risky populations” (2010:11). It is through this notion that peace bonds and 
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anti-social behaviour orders criminalize. Specifically, the discourse suggested that the 
preventative nature of peace bonds seek to identify and predict risky situations by relying 
on a complainant’s fear of future harm. The discourse also assumed that peace bonds 
attempt to identify risky populations. This is reflected in the textual representation of s. 
810.1 as “pedophile peace bonds.” Under this label, individuals subject to a s. 810.1 
recognizance are assumed to be pedophiles even when a formal diagnoses based on a 
prior or even present pedophilic criminal offence may not exist. Even when s. 810.2 was 
being debated in the House of Commons, the Honourable Justice Gordon Kirkby 
highlighted that the section’s “...underlying principle has been clear from the beginning. 
The goal has always been to prevent violent incidents, to establish in a court of law the 
risk presented by certain individuals and to command those individuals to keep the peace 
and be of good behaviour” (Parliament of Canada, 1997). These situations and sub-
populations can be seen to pose a risk to the values and practices integral to neo-
liberalism (Mosher and Brockman, 2010: 11). Insecurity caused by the uncertainty of risk 
and harm has become a main concern for neo-liberal governments that attempt to 
enterprise their citizens to act autonomously through freedom (Foucault, 1979/2008: 148; 
Rose, 1996: 340; Hamann, 2009: 53). According to Ericson, it becomes the job of the 
neo-liberal state to transform uncertainty to security that enables both safety and 
freedom—more specifically, “freedom from fear” (2007a: 3, 163). As this thesis has 
shown, peace bonds are a form of counter-law that seeks to govern risk by limiting the 
liberty of those individuals that cause a complainant fear. Once a “freedom from fear” is 
achieved through the criminalization of risky situations and populations, the neo-liberal 
citizen is once again enterprised to act autonomously, a practice that is integral to neo-
liberalism (Ericson, 2007a: 5). 
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  The aspect of this discourse analysis that was most surprising was the extent to 
which peace bonds contribute to a surveillant assemblage. Admittedly, police and 
community notification and supervision are widely used in reaction to criminal 
offending—under a sex offender registry for example. As noted by Ericson, sex offender 
registries represent government programs that mobilize citizens as agents of surveillance. 
Intriguingly, these programs started far before similar programs that were given 
unprecedented impetus in the aftermath of 9/11 (2007a: 187). Surveillance under 
Canada’s peace bond regime also mobilizes citizens as agents of surveillance, and has 
been doing so prior to 9/11 as well25. However, unlike sex offender registries, peace bond 
programs assume that these methods of surveillance are extended to situations where past 
or present criminal offending may not exist. A comparable surveillance network can be 
found under the anti-social behaviour laws discussed by Ericson (2007a). These laws 
encourage local people to participate in their policing and enforcement, even when it is 
not know whether harms will come to fruition (Crawford, 2003; Ericson, 2007a: 160-1). 
Although the community notification and supervision component of this assemblage is 
comparable to Canada’s peace bond regime, Ericson (2007a) never mentions whether 
police databases are updated as a result of these laws. The use of technological police 
notification when an inherently criminal act may not have occurred seems to be exclusive 
to s. 810.       
    The extent to which peace bonds contribute to a surveillant assemblage is also 
reflected in their panoptic and synoptic capabilities. According to Haggerty and Ericson, 
there is a distinct disciplinary element vested in panoptic observation (2000: 607). 
                                                 
25 Recall that in 1993 and 1997, parliament decided to reform peace bond legislation by extending its scope 
through Bill C-126 and Bill C-55 respectfully. These Bills did not create peace bond surveillance, but they 
illustrate that these measures were being used well before 2001.    
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Apparatuses of discipline can be seen as top-down observation that “...concentrates, 
focuses, and encloses” (Foucault, 1978/2007: 44). This was reflected in the use of a 
surety to supervise individuals subject to a peace bond to ensure that conditions of a 
recognizance are not broken. Alternatively, an assemblage’s synoptic element facilitates 
“bottom-up” forms of observation and parallels Foucault’s panopticon by allowing a large 
number of individuals to focus on something in common (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 
618). This was supported by the discourse, which assumes that a large number of people 
in the community will focus on the respondent to ensure the complainant’s safety and, in 
turn, security. Not only did the discourse imply that community notification and 
supervision could provide a peace bond applicant with security, but it also suggested that 
this assemblage has the capacity to scrutinize public officials. This capacity was not 
considered in the original operationalization of the surveillant assemblage tenet, but this 
is an important aspect of an assemblage’s synoptic character according to Haggerty and 
Ericson (2000: 618). Overall, however, this thesis has shown that peace bonds are an 
extensive form of counter-law. This is reflected in the different aspects embodied in each 
tenet of Ericson’s analytic that were captured by this discourse analysis and were not 
considered by the original operationalization of each tenet. The results of this thesis’ 
discourse analysis suggested that peace bonds govern risk by relying on uncertainty, 
embodied in one’s fear of contingent and ambiguous harm. This facilitates a 
precautionary logic that seeks to prevent harm by mobilizing police and community 
notification and supervision, and restricting a respondent’s liberty even when a criminal 
act may not have occurred. By eroding traditional criminal law principles, proving that a 
complainant is fearful of a respondent under s. 810 can result in the expansion of the 
state’s capacity to criminalize and administer surveillance through police and community 
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notification and supervision.  
 After summarizing the results of this research, several similarities can be drawn 
between Canada’s peace bond regime and the UK’s Anti-Social Behaviour Orders 
(ASBOs). As highlighted by Crawford, ASBOs are precautionary orders based on the 
fear of future harm, which rely on a civil burden of proof, and deploy “webs of 
affiliation” that charge the local community to report breaches and mobilize the police 
(2009, 818-22). Although the discourse never explicitly associates peace bonds with 
notions of “anti-social behaviour,” future research should examine how notions of anti-
social behaviour are constructed in the law and if the conduct peace bonds seek to 
minimize are similar to the conduct governed by Anti-Social Behaviour Orders. An 
analysis of this nature may ultimately ask: are peace bonds Canada’s Anti-Social 
Behaviour Order?     
 In conclusion, Canada’s peace bond regime is being used for multiple purposes, 
includes many possible offences, and has the capacity to affect the lives of many people. 
It will be interesting to see what the future holds for peace bonds, particularly since the 
advent of Bill 168. Perhaps peace bonds will be integrated into managerial “risk 
management” techniques. Or, perhaps the conditions imposed by a peace bond will 
become even more invasive26. However, in their expansion, “counter-law regimes 
organize their own disasters by creating new harms and incubating risks” (Ericson, 
2007a: 219). It will be interesting to see if peace bonds develop consistently with 
Ericson’s warning.           
 
                                                 See the recent amendments under Canada’s Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. 
Shoker Act (2011).   
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Appendix A: Peace Bond Statistics from the Province of Ontario (2003-2010) 
Table 1: Total number of peace bond applications filed in the Ontario Court of Justice  
YEAR ONTARIO 
2003 8,401 
2004 8,635 
2005 8,564 
2006 8,578 
2007 9,220 
2008 9,112 
2009 10,250 
2010 9,917 
 
Table 2: Total number of peace bond orders made in the Ontario Court of Justice  
YEAR ONTARIO 
2003 6,692 
2004 6,773 
2005 6,858 
2006 7,026 
2007 7,473 
2008 7,424 
2009 8,167 
2010 7,899 
 
Table 3: Charges With NO Application Filed under s.810 (but where Peace Bond order 
was made) 
 
YEAR ONTARIO 
2003 9,778 
2004 8,976 
2005 8,528 
2006 8,860 
2007 9,130 
2008 9,249 
2009 10,246 
2010 11,373 
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